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September 29, 1989

OCA FILE *LEG***LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM**

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

National Security Council (Hughes x3723)
Department of State (Bachrach 647-4463)
Department of Defense (Brick 697-1305)
Central Intelligence Agency 482-

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SUBJECT: Two sets of ACDA prepared draft oversight material:
(1) Talking point papers for use by the House and Senate observers on their October trips to Geneva and Vienna; and
(2) Questions and Answers asked of Mr. Hanmer at his confirmation hearing to become ACDA's Deputy Director.

NOTE: Both of these must be up on the Hill by October 3rd so your prompt response is essential. We will assume your agency has no comments if you have not responded within the deadline.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than 3:00 P.M., MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1989.

Questions should be referred to JEFF ASHFORD (395-3920).

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: B. Smith
D. Taft

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Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

UNITED STATES

SOVIET UNION

START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

General Approach:	Reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner achieving equal intermediate ceilings by agreed dates over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force.	Reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in two phases over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force, with subsequent negotiations for additional reductions.
	Both sides agree that the Soviet approach from the September Ministerial opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. However, no further strategic arms control treaties can be concluded with the Soviet Union until it corrects its violations of the ABM Treaty involving the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable manner that meets U.S. criteria.	At the September 1989 Ministerial, the Soviets agreed to "completely dismantle" the Krasnoyarsk radar.
Delivery Vehicles:	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic offensive delivery systems, which comprise deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers and heavy bombers.	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic offensive delivery systems, which comprise deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their associated launchers and deployed heavy bombers.
Warheads:	6,000 warhead ceiling, to include deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber equipped only for nuclear-armed gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.	Same as the U.S. position on ballistic missile warheads, some differences on ALCM warheads.
Warhead Sublimits:	Sublimits of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads and 3,000 - 3,300 ICBM warheads.	Sublimit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads; if 3,300 sublimit on ICBMs, then must also be 3,300 sublimit on SLBMs. Sublimit of 1,100 on bomber-carried warheads.
Heavy ICBMs:	A limit of 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ballistic missiles. Ban on production, flight testing or modernization of new or existing types of heavy ICBMs.	A limit of 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ICBMs. Production, flight testing or modernization of existing types of heavy ICBMs permitted. Development, testing and deployment of new types of heavy ICBMs banned.
Throw-weight:	The aggregate throwweight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to 50 percent below their throwweights level as of December 31, 1986. Neither side will exceed this level for the duration of this treaty.	Same as the U.S. position in principle, but reduction from the throwweight level existing at treaty signature.
Ballistic Missile Warheads:	For existing types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than the number of warheads declared and agreed at the Washington Summit. For future types, as well as changes in the number of warheads on existing types, procedures remain to be agreed.	For existing and future types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than an agreed number of warheads. For existing types, the number was agreed upon at the Washington Summit.
Mobile ICBMs:	U.S. will lift ban on mobile ICBMs, contingent upon Congressional funding of U.S. mobile ICBMs. START negotiators to work out the appropriate details of limits to be applied to mobile ICBMs and effective verification measures.	Permitted, with limits on launchers and warheads.
Heavy Bombers:	Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV). Each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit.	Same as the U.S. position.
ALCMs:	ALCMs defined as air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers. An agreed number of ALCMs shall be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs, for the purpose of counting against the 6,000 warhead limit.	ALCMs defined as air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The number of ALCMs attributed to ALCM heavy bombers shall be the maximum number each type is equipped for. Nuclear-armed ALCMs shall be limited under a proposed sublimit of 1,100 for all bomber-carried warheads.

SLCMs: The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles). Such limitations will not involve counting these SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides commit themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include use of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection. Thus far, the U.S. has not identified any effective verification approach for SLCMs. In absence of plan for effective verification, U.S. proposed that the sides make non-binding declarations of nuclear SLCM numbers.

Soviets accept basic principles. Specific force level limitations of 400 on nuclear-armed and of 600 on conventional-armed SLCMs, but the Soviets fail to identify effective verification measures. The Soviet approach would also undermine U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location—an important underpinning of deterrence.

Verification of Compliance: Provisions, at a minimum, to include: exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons; continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities; and short-notice inspection of sites where treaty-limited systems are located both during and after the reduction period. Inspections requested at sites where a party considers that covert production, storage, repair or deployment may be occurring. Details remain to be worked out.

Soviets agree on need for verification and have made proposals. However, the proposals are not adequate for effective verification.

U.S. has proposed that the two sides accelerate efforts to agree on, and begin implementing as soon as possible, verification and stability measures to acquire practical experience and speed up resolution of verification issues. Proposed measures include: establishment now of on-site perimeter/portals monitoring of certain missile production facilities; exchange of data on each side's strategic nuclear forces; prohibiting data denial, including encryption of telemetry, on all launches of designated ICBMs and SLBMs from test ranges; demonstration of procedures for inspection of reentry vehicles; addressing the problem of short-time-of-flight SLBMs; notification of strategic exercises; and experimentation on identification of missiles (tagging). Agreement on advanced notification of major strategic exercises was reached at the September 1989 Ministerial.

At the September 1989 Ministerial, U.S. and the Soviets agreed to pursue verification and stability measures in detail in Geneva. The sides signed an "umbrella" agreement that outlines overall concept for negotiating these measures.

*** D & S Defense and Space ***

*** To be reviewed as a result of the Wyoming Ministerial meeting ***

General Approach: The U.S. seeks to facilitate a cooperative transition to a stabilizing balance of offensive and defensive forces, should effective defenses against strategic ballistic missiles prove feasible. The U.S. also seeks to preserve the option to develop and deploy advanced defenses when they are ready, at a measured pace and in a cooperative way. Defense and Space issues should be addressed in a new treaty building upon and clarifying the language in the Washington Summit Joint Statement to ensure unambiguous meaning of commitments made in the future treaty.

Defense and Space issues should be addressed in a new and separate agreement, implementing the Washington Summit Joint Statement, without substantive clarification. The Soviets have refused to develop a Joint Draft Text of an agreement.

No further strategic arms control treaties can be concluded with the Soviet Union until it corrects its violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty involving the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable manner that meets U.S. criteria.

Commitment of Non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty: Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying or acquiring capabilities for strategic defenses.

Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time (9-10 years) for any reason.

Activities during the Non-Withdrawal Period

U.S. has proposed initiatives to help clarify the meaning of the phrase, "research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

In order to demonstrate that U.S. testing of space-based components of ABM systems based on "other physical principles" and capable of substituting for ABM intercepter missiles, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not represent the deployment of such components, the U.S. is prepared to carry out such permitted testing only from designated ABM test satellites. The U.S. view is that the number of such satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. The U.S. believes the number 15 falls well below that threshold.

Notification associated with ABM tests in space would be provided for in the predictability protocol (see below).

The U.S. also proposed that neither party shall object, on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing, or deployment by the other party of any space-based sensors. Accordingly, each party may develop, test, or deploy space-based sensors without restriction. This proposal is designed to avoid future verification problems.

The Soviets would constrain activities to an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is more restrictive than agreed to by the parties in 1972, and possibly even more restrictive than the "narrow interpretation."

The Soviets have rejected the U.S. space testing (ABM test satellite) initiative and the space-based sensors proposal, claiming they are contrary to the ABM Treaty and the Washington Summit Joint Statement.

Entry into Force/Duration/Linkage:

Entry into force is contingent upon entry into force of the START Treaty. A D&S Treaty would be of unlimited duration with the length of the "specified period" of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to be negotiated; the ABM Treaty will be observed through that period and until either party exercises the right to deploy. The D&S Treaty must stand on its own merits. A START Treaty should not be linked to resolution of D&S issues.

This agreement would enter into force simultaneously with the START Treaty. The agreement will expire at the end of the non-withdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise. A START treaty cannot be concluded without resolution of D&S issues. A START treaty would cease to be in force if either party violated the ABM Treaty or this agreement.

Rights to Withdraw:

The U.S. insists that the sides retain withdrawal rights recognized under international law, such as those exercised in the event that a side's supreme national interests are jeopardized, as well as other standard termination and suspension rights, such as those in case of material breach.

The Soviets propose an "unqualified" non-withdrawal commitment, under which a party could not withdraw from the ABM Treaty or this agreement for any reason.

Regime after Non-Withdrawal Period:

As agreed at the Washington Summit, intensive discussion of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified non-withdrawal period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Either party will have the right after the period to deploy strategic missile defenses beyond ABM Treaty limits, upon giving the other party six months' written notice of its intention to do so.

Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its own course of action. (However, under the Soviet proposal the D&S agreement would terminate at the end of the non-withdrawal period, thereby leaving the ABM Treaty to govern withdrawal rights.) The Soviets propose that these discussions deal with the "problems of ABM defenses taking into account the new situation resulting from reductions in strategic offensive arms." Should the sides not agree otherwise in these discussions, after the D&S agreement expires each side shall determine for itself its further actions with respect to the ABM Treaty and the START Treaty, subject to compliance with the relevant procedures of these treaties. The Soviets therefore argue that the "right to deploy" was not agreed at the Washington Summit, but that ABM Treaty-governed withdrawal rights would be reestablished after the non-withdrawal period.

Predictability:

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship to reduce the risk of nuclear war. As confidence-building measures to provide predictability in the strategic defense programs of the other nation, the U.S. proposed the following measures in the field of strategic ballistic missile defense, to be implemented on a reciprocal, comparable and voluntary basis: annual exchanges of programmatic data and meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, and observations of tests. The U.S. has pointed out that Soviet-proposed verification measures are unworkable and could jeopardize U.S. and Allied security. The two sides are working on a joint draft text of a protocol on these matters.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The Soviets have accepted some U.S. concepts for confidence-building measures, including exchanges of data, meetings of experts, and observations of tests. (The Soviets have not accepted the U.S. proposal that predictability measures encompass research activities not observable by National Technical Means.) However, the Soviets would make such measures compulsory in order to ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty and the D&S agreement being negotiated. Additionally, they propose an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous situations, mandatory on-site inspection of certain sites and facilities which give rise to concerns, and resolution of compliance questions in the Standing Consultative Commission. The two sides are working on a joint draft text of a protocol on these matters.

U.S. Position on SLCMs in START

o The US and the Soviets have agreed to find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range (greater than 1500 km) nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limits will be outside the START central limits of 1600 delivery vehicles and 6000 warheads.

o Because the US has not been able to identify a verification regime that would allow the sides to effectively verify a limit on SLCMs, the US has proposed that the sides make non-binding declarations of numbers of nuclear SLCMs.

o Verification difficulties include the following:

-- Any verification regime must address the problem of a covert inventory, particularly covert production facilities. Because SLCMs are small and can be produced in buildings which could be used for aircraft manufacturing or other industrial activities, the Soviets could produce excess numbers of SLCMs without significant risk of being detected.

-- Although the technology exists for distinguishing nuclear warheads from conventional warheads when a detector is placed near an unshielded warhead, cheating scenarios involving shielding in the launcher or missile itself, or storing missiles in inaccessible locations, would allow a side to conceal nuclear SLCMs from cooperative measures based on radiation detection.

-- Even if the Soviets complied with limits on nuclear SLCMs during peacetime, the technology for insertable warhead components would allow them to switch warheads rapidly in a crisis; a side could thus have an unlimited number of nuclear SLCMs available in such a breakout scenario, while appearing to be in compliance during peacetime.

-- Many US SLCM platforms, such as attack submarines (SSNs) and Aegis cruisers, use launchers that are compatible with other weapons (e.g., torpedoes and surface-to-air missiles). Thus, counting rules based on numbers of launchers would either penalize a side with large numbers of excess SLCMs or be so heavily discounted that they provide no more confidence than simple declarations.

-- On-board inspections for SLCMs would be extremely intrusive, considering their limited value, and would disrupt the Navy's operational requirements (particularly for submarines). In addition, they would run counter to the Navy's long-standing policy of "Neither Confirm Nor Deny" with regard to nuclear weapons on ships.

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U.S. Position on ALCM Counting Rules in START

- o The U.S. position would attribute an agreed number of ALCMs to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of counting against the 6000 warhead central limit in START.
- o Under the U.S. position, a heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs could actually carry more ALCMs than the agreed number at any particular time; it could also carry fewer ALCMs.
- o Because there would be no limit on the number carried at any one time, the U.S. position does not require short-notice on-site inspection of heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of confirming that such bombers are not carrying more than the agreed number.
- o However, the U.S. position would provide for inspections of heavy bombers of a type that had been flight-tested with ALCMs but are not equipped with ALCMs. These inspections would deter a side from illegally equipping heavy bombers with ALCMs when they were declared not to be ALCM carriers.
- o The sides would be able to determine the number of ALCM heavy bomber platforms from NTM and then multiply that number by the attributed number of ALCMs to confirm the number of warheads to count toward the 6000 ceiling.

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ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION

Background

At the Moscow Summit in 1988, the two sides agreed to, and recorded, a number of elements of common ground on mobile ICBM verification. These elements have helped to guide the delegations in Geneva in putting together a detailed joint working paper addressing mobile verification.

During experts meetings prior to the Wyoming Ministerial, the U.S. side responded to Ambassador Nazarkin's suggestion at the end of Round XI of START that the sides attempt to elaborate and expand on the Moscow common elements. Specifically, the U.S. tabled a document proposing additional elements on which the sides could agree. The Soviet side has, with some modifications, accepted several of these.

Details of Agreement

The Soviets have accepted U.S. proposals that:

- o Upon return to garrison following a dispersal, rail-mobile ICBMs would be subject to enhanced NTM measures whose nature, scope and procedures are to be agreed upon by the two sides.
- o No more than 10 road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be based or located in a restricted area.
- o NTM enhancement measures would involve either moving road-mobile launchers halfway out of their structures, or displaying such launchers next to their structures with the roofs of the structures open at the option of the inspecting side.

In addition, the Soviets agreed in principle that rail garrisons would be limited in size. The sides have not agreed how this element will be recorded or how size will be measured.

Verification and Stability Measures

-- We cannot predict what the Soviet Union may propose in the future on Verification and Stability Measures, however we can outline what they have proposed to date.

-- At the September 1989 Wyoming Ministerial, we and the Soviets signed an agreement in principle committing the sides to the goal of working out trial verification measures.

-- The sides will discuss in Geneva the following U.S.-proposed verification and stability measures in detail, with the goal of trying out verification procedures for the START Treaty and to enhance confidence in order to facilitate early completion of the Treaty:

- early exchange of data;
- halting ballistic missile telemetry data denial, including encryption;
- establishment of on-site perimeter/portal monitoring of certain missile production facilities;
- addressing the problem of short-time-of-flight SLBMs;
- familiarization with procedures for inspection of numbers of warheads on ballistic missiles; and
- demonstration and information exchange on techniques for the identification of missiles ("tagging")

Additionally the U.S.-proposed agreement on strategic exercise notification has been signed by the U.S. and Soviets.

Strategic Systems Under START

-- The final list of strategic systems will not be known until the date for the conclusion of START is clearer. The following systems, are listed in the JBT:

For the U.S.*:

- Minuteman II
- Minuteman III
- Peacekeeper
- Poseidon
- Trident I
- Trident II
- B-52
- B-1

For the U.S.S.R.**:

- SS-11
- SS-13
- SS-17
- SS-18
- SS-19
- SS-24
- SS-25
- SS-N-3
- SS-N-6
- SS-N-8
- SS-N-17
- SS-N-18
- SS-N-20
- SS-N-23
- Bear
- Bison
- Blackjack
- Backfire

*B-2 not included pending resolution of when a new HB begins to count.

**The Soviets have thus far rejected our inclusion of the SS-N-5, Bison and Backfire:

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

September 29, 1989

TO: Sue Thau, Joan Killgore - OMB

FROM: Linda Emery - ACDA/OCA *LE*

SUBJECT: Request for Interagency Clearance

Attached are ACDA's proposed responses to questions posed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Mr. S. Read Hanmer during his confirmation hearing. Mr. Hanmer has been nominated to become ACDA's Deputy Director.

We anticipate that the SFRS will be conducting a business meeting on Wednesday, October 4. We therefore need inter-agency clearance on the answers by COB Monday, Oct. 2.

Thank you for your assistance.

*A few
p.s. more to follow -*

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Q2. Were the Soviets prepared to agree to dismantle their illegal Krasnoyarsk radar without conditions? Why then did the U.S. reportedly gratuitously agree to allow Soviet inspections of the "grand-fathered" Fylingdales and Thule early warning radars, and even agree to consult with our allies on Soviet compliance concerns about them? Is the U.S. satisfied that Soviet dismantling of their Flat Twin and Pawn Shop illegal ABM radars at Gomel satisfied the precise dismantling procedures that the Soviets agreed to last December? Was the Soviet failure to fulfill these agreed procedures discussed at the Ministerial? If not, why not?

A2. At the Wyoming Ministerial, the Soviets said that they would completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station, with no linkage to other issues. The U.S. expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

The U.S. did not agree to allow Soviet inspections of the Thule and Fylingdales radars. The Soviets reiterated concerns about the U.S. large phased-array radars at Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, Great Britain. The U.S. promised to consider the Soviet request in consultation with Allies.

Although dismantlement/destruction was not completed on the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars exactly as agreed, the U.S. removed this issue from the SCC agenda during the July 1989 session. The U.S. position is that the Flat Twin radar and the Pawn Shop van near Gomel are no longer deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty. However, some of the procedures that the Soviet Union specified in SCC-XXXVI were not fully carried out. In particular, the U.S. inspection team was unable to locate at Gomel the Pawn Shop mechanism that was to be cut. On a related matter, the pedestal supporting the Flat Twin has been cut. The U.S., however, expected that the Soviet commitment to cut the Flat Twin "body" would result in cutting the mounting ring, azimuth drive, and elevation drive.

These issues were not discussed at the Ministerial. The U.S. has told the Soviets that while we are removing the violation from the SCC agenda, the Soviet Union should display to NTM the pieces of the Pawn Shop turning mechanism at Gomel for 30 days. Cutting these three elements and displaying the pieces for 30 days also would be a constructive step. Instead, the Soviets removed these items from the site.

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Q12. What did the U.S. gain from the Soviets in exchange for the U.S. initiative inviting the Soviets to visit U.S. SDI facilities? Why was this U.S. proposal "not pre-conditioned on a reciprocal invitation by the Soviets"? Is this concessionary posture the customary U.S. negotiating posture?

A12. During his discussions in Wyoming with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Secretary Baker invited a group of Soviet experts to visit Los Alamos National Laboratory and the TRW Corporation's test facility in San Juan Capistrano to learn more about SDI research activities. The U.S. hopes that the visit will lead to Soviet understanding and eventual acceptance of U.S. proposals in the Defense and Space Talks for regular and reciprocal visits to laboratories. The U.S. believes that such visits would be useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and would reduce the risk of technological surprise. The invitation was offered without any preconditions because the experience gained by the demonstration visit will show how one of the important U.S.-proposed CBMs -- visits to laboratories -- would be implemented in practice. These measures, proposed by the U.S. in the Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, will increase the openness of U.S. and Soviet activities in the field of strategic ballistic missile defense.

1. Did the U.S. agree to constrain space-based SDI testing, which would cripple the SDI program?

1. No. The whole approach of the United States in the Defense and Space Talks is designed to enhance strategic stability and U.S. national security by facilitating a cooperative transition to a stable balance of offensive and defensive forces if effective defenses prove feasible. At the Ministerial meeting Secretary Baker made clear our continued commitment to the SDI program. We made it clear to the Soviets that we will continue to evaluate the feasibility of effective defenses and will deploy them when they are ready.

Q14. Please describe the precise formulation of the new Soviet position on the ABM Treaty and its impact on SDI.

A14. At the Ministerial, regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The two sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. The U.S. side made clear our continued commitment to the SDI program. We made it clear that we will continue to evaluate the feasibility of effective defenses and will deploy them when they are ready.

Q15. The U.S. withdrawal of its longstanding proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in start is "contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs." Does this mean that Congress must agree to fund both the rail mobile MX and the Midgetmen systems? What funding levels, deployment levels, and initial operational capability dates must Congress approve in order for the U.S. to remove its proposed START ban on mobile ICBM deployment?

A15. The Administration has proposed a program to the Congress for funding for both land- and rail-mobile ICBM development, production and deployment. Congressional support for this program, at the funding levels requested, is essential if we are to negotiate a START agreement. (U)

In our view, the Soviets will not accept a START agreement which bans mobile ICBMs. However, we cannot accept an agreement permitting mobiles unless the U.S. has them as well. Thus, Congressional support for mobile ICBMs is absolute requirement for START. (U)

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✓ Q6. When will the Soviets destroy Krasnoyarsk? Will the U.S. be allowed to accomplish on-site inspection of this destruction? Is the U.S. still considering whether to declare Krasnoyarsk a "material breach" of the ABM Treaty?
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A.6. Details remain to be worked out. We anticipate that this issue will be a primary topic at the next SCC session, and we are considering the creation of an experts group to assure that the sides agree on the procedures, timing, and especially the U.S. requirements for elimination of this major violation of a central provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty provides for verification by national technical means of verification (NTM). While we are not excluding the possibility of a visit to the site at some future date, we believe that the Soviets should complete the elimination in such a manner as to be verifiable by NTM.

The U.S. has told the Soviets that, until resolved, this issue will raise the question of material breach. If it is resolved to U.S. satisfaction by the complete elimination of the radar, declaration of a material breach, and implementation of appropriate responses would not be required.

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